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Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allow-
ing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between
computationally easy and hard regimes are found and interpreted in terms of the geometric struc-
ture of the space of solutions. We introduce an iterative algorithm to solve intermediate and large
instances, and discuss competing states of optimal revenue and maximal number of satisfied bidders.
The algorithm can be generalized to the hard phase and to more sophisticated auction protocols.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh,75.10.Nr,05.20.-y
Auctions constitute an important part of economic ac-
tivity [1]. With today’s pronounced role of e-commerce
and the use of the internet as a world-wide market place,
fundamental changes have occurred in the use of auc-
tions. Their popularity has increased due to freely ac-
cessible web services, and both the range and the nature
of objects which can be bought and sold have diversified.
Single-item auction protocols are however inappropriate
when the number of objects to be sold is large, especially
if buyers are interested in bundles of objects with com-
plementary features. In such cases, it is preferrable to
allow buyers to bid on combinations of objects instead of
single items. Such auctions are referred to as combina-
torial auctions (CA). Initially motivated by the problem
of airport time slot allocation and by the distribution of
radio spectrum licenses, CA are now widely used in a va-
riety of contexts [2]. Finding the maximum auctioneer’s
payoff allocation to a given CA is a computationally hard
problem requiring exponential time resources. Fast and
efficient heuristic algorithms are thus needed to identify
optimal or close-to-optimal allocations, and models of CA
are here of interest as theoretical benchmarks [3, 4].
In this Letter, we will first map a generic CA problem
onto a geometrically constrained lattice gas defined on
a sparse random graph, coupled to a local chemical po-
tential. This allows us to relate the computational com-
plexity of determining optimal allocations to the glassy
behaviour induced by the geometric frustration of the
system. The latter here results from conflicting bids.
The statistical mechanics approach to Bethe lattice glass
models [5] then allows us to characterize the typical prop-
erties of large random instances of CA, and to formulate
algorithms for solving single instances.
A simple CA model describes N players and a total set
ofM items to be sold. Each player i bids for an individual
subset Ai ⊆ {1, . . . ,M} for which he is willing to pay a
price νi > 0. It is understood here that the player is
only interested in the full set Ai, but not in any proper
subset. The bid of player i is thus given by the pair
(Ai, νi). More complex CA where bidders submit lists
of ni ≥ 1 subset-price pairs, {(Aℓi , ν
ℓ
i )}l=1,...,ni nested
by logical ORs or XORs can be reduced to the case of
single-item bids, with a possibly enlarged set of bidders
and items [6]. Hence we shall confine our discussion to
the ni = 1 case of single-subset bids.
Let us indicate a successful bid by xi = 1, and an
unsuccessful one by xi = 0. Then the winner determina-
tion problem (WDP) consists in finding a ‘configuration’
x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ {0, 1}
N , which maximizes the auc-
tioneer’s revenueR =
∑
i νixi and respects the constraint
that each item be sold at most once, i.e., that xixj = 0
whenever Ai ∩ Aj 6= 0 for a pair i 6= j. It is also in-
teresting to discuss how far the optimal solution is from
a configuration maximizing the number Ns =
∑
i xi of
satisfied bidders. These two tasks are usually conflicting,
and can be formulated as a multi-objective optimization
problem whose outcome depends on the optimization pri-
ority. In particular we will compare results of procedures
first maximizing R and then Ns, and vice versa.
Deciding which bids (Ai, νi) are successful (xi = 1)
is a non-trivial optimization problem, because bids can
overlap. If Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅ for some i 6= j, the two bidders
i and j cannot simultaneously be successful. Even an
agent with a high bid νi is not guaranteed to win, as it
may be advantageous for the auctioneer to allocate the
items contained in Ai to a number of other agents having
a higher aggregate revenue. Indeed the CA optimal allo-
cation problem is NP-complete, as can be demonstrated
by its equivalence to the weighted set packing problem
[7]. NP-completeness, however, refers to a worst-case sce-
nario and does not necessarily imply that one cannot find
the optimal solution for some large real-life CA problems.
Here, we focus on a simple probabilistic model where each
player submits a single bid. This setup retains the same
level of computational complexity as more general cases,
and the WDP can be reduced to computing the ground
state of a lattice gas defined on a suitable random graph,
where particles residing on vertices are subject to a geo-
metric constraint as well as to a local chemical potential.
The Model — Let us take N players and M = αN
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Example of a CA interaction network:
factor graph (left), and corresponding conflict graph (right).
Bidders Bi are indicated as circles, items ga as squares at-
tached via links to all the bidders wanting to pay for them.
In the conflict graph bidders are connected by a link if and
only if they share at least one item. Any item of degree k in
the factor graph corresponds to a k-clique of vertices in the
conflict graph. Ia is the set of players bidding for item a.
items, with α = O(1). Player i bids for a subset Ai
containing ℓi items, and any item a in turn is chosen by
ka agents. Any realization of this bidding structure can
then be represented by a factor graph containing bidder
and item nodes, cf. Fig. 1. A compact representation is
given by the conflict graph (CG), in which two players i
and j are linked whenever Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅. More complex
bidding protocols can be cast in the same formalism [10].
The CA can be mapped to a lattice gas of particles
on the CG, with occupation variables xi ∈ {0, 1} rep-
resenting the bidders’ success/failure. The Hamiltonian
H = −R = −
∑
i νixi describes a coupling of xi to a lo-
cal field νi, and it can be associated with a formal inverse
temperature β. A chemical potential µ allows to control
the particle number Ns =
∑
i xi. The grand-canonical
partition function of such a lattice-gas reads
Z =
∑
x∈{0,1}N
exp
(
N∑
i=1
(µ+ βνi)xi
) ∏
(i,j)∈C
(1− xixj), (1)
where C is the set of edges of the CG. The product over C
implements the compatibility constraint that each item
can be sold at most once, and can be interpreted as a
volume exclusion for neighbouring lattice sites. Temper-
ature and chemical potential can be used to select com-
patible solutions in configuration space: (i) the choice
β → ∞ and µ = 0 corresponds to configurations max-
imizing R independently of Ns, (ii) β = 0 and µ → ∞
selects configurations maximizing Ns only, (iii) β → ∞
before µ → ∞: maximizes Ns within the subset of
configurations of maximal revenue, (iv) µ → ∞ before
β → ∞: maximizes R within the subset of compati-
ble configurations of maximum number of satisfied bid-
ders. The maximal revenue can thus be computed as
R∗ = limβ→∞ ∂β lnZ at finite µ, and the maximum
N∗s = limµ→∞ ∂µ lnZ at finite β.
The cavity approach — The search for optimal
configurations can be performed efficiently via algorithms
based on the cavity method. For a general presentation
of the method see e.g. [8, 9] and references therein. Fol-
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FIG. 2: Illustration of cavity biases and fields.
lowing [8], one can introduce cavity biases {ua→i} and
cavity fields {hj→a} associated with the links of the fac-
tor graph of a single CA instance as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The cavity bias ua→i measures the likelihood that item a
is already assigned to another bidder k ∈ Ia \ i, and can-
not be sold to i. The cavity field hi→a is then given by
the re-weighted price minus the sum of all ub→i arriving
from b ∈ Ai except from a. It measures the likelihood
that the bidder would win if his bid did not contain item
a. The resulting self-consistent equations are the basis of
the so-called belief propagation (BP) algorithm:
ua→i = uˆ({hk→a}) =
1
β + µ
ln

1 + ∑
k∈Ia\i
e(β+µ)hk→a


hi→a = hˆ(νi, {ub→i}) =
µ+ βνi
β + µ
−
∑
b∈Ai\a
ub→i. (2)
If the iteration of Eqs. (2) converges to a fixed point, we
can estimate the probability that bid i becomes satisfied:
Pi ≡ P (xi = 1) ≃
exp{(µ+ β)Hi}
1 + exp{(µ+ β)Hi}
(3)
with an effective local field Hi = (µ + βνi)/(β + µ) −∑
b∈Ai
ub→i. The payoff estimate becomes
∑
iR = νiPi,
and the expected number of satisfied bids is Ns =
∑
i Pi.
The maximization of these quantities can be achieved
by tuning β and µ as described after Eq. (1). In principle,
the limit β → ∞ at µ = 0 – corresponding to a maxi-
mum revenue – can be taken directly in Eqs. (2), and
has a simple interpretation. In this case ua→i is a warn-
ing to bidder i that he needs to allocate at least a price
ua→i to item a in order to outbid the other players in Ia.
Consequently, in order to secure his subset Ai, he has to
offer at least
∑
a∈Ai
ua→i. The field Hi is thus given by
the difference between the amount i is willing to pay and
the minimal amount required for i to win. If Hi > 0 the
bidder will be successful (xi = 1) with probability 1 (i.e.
in all such solutions), whereas Hi < 0 indicates a loosing
bid. Players with Hi = 0 are successful in some opti-
mal assignments, and unsuccessful in others. In order
to deal with the latter degeneracy, one has to resort to a
more subtle limit of Eqs. (2), allowing for fields vanishing
proportionally to the formal temperature.
3Eqs. (2) are valid for any fixed choice of the graphs,
prices and bids, i.e. the effective fields can be determined
for any specific CA instance. They can be solved itera-
tively in O(N) steps whenever the iteration converges.
The fields {Hi} at convergence of the BP iteration can
be used as input for an iterative search/decimation proce-
dure, where items are assigned iteratively to bidders with
highest Hi, and BP equations are then iterated for the
reduced problem containing only variables not yet fixed
in the previous step. This procedure runs in O(N logN)
steps if a finite fraction of items is assigned at each step.
Solution for typical cases — To extract analytical
estimates for the CA outcomes we average Eqs. (2) over
given random factor-graph and price ensembles. In doing
so we obtain self-consistent integral equations for the or-
der parameters, i.e. the histograms of both the cavity bi-
ases (Q(u)) and the cavity fields (P (h)). In the so-called
replica symmetric (RS) phase [8, 9], these equations are
P (h) =
∞∑
ℓ=0
p˜ℓ
∫ ℓ∏
t=1
dutQ(ut)
∫
dνP (ν|ℓ + 1)δ(h− hˆ)
Q(u) =
∞∑
k=1
q˜k
∫ k∏
t=1
dhtP (ht)δ(u− uˆ) (4)
where P (ν|ℓ+1) is the distribution of prices ν for agents
bidding for sets of ℓ+1 objects, hˆ, uˆ are given by (2), p˜ℓ =
(ℓ + 1)pℓ+1/〈ℓ〉 and q˜k = (k + 1)qk+1/〈k〉, where pℓ and
qk are the degree distributions of the bidders and items
in the factor graph. Eqs. (4) are solved via population
dynamics [8]. Here we focus on two simple non-trivial CA
ensembles. In both cases, every player selects each item
independently with probability z/M . The probability
that a player wants ℓ items is Poissonian, pℓ = e
−zzℓ/ℓ !,
for large M . Similarly, the probability that a given item
is chosen by k players is qk = e
−λλk/k ! for large N ,
where λ = z/α. The considered ensembles differ in the
prices the bidders are willing to pay:
(i) Constant prices — Every bidder who bids for at
least one object offers the same price νi ≡ 1. BP-
results from Eqs. (4) are shown in the inset of Fig. 3
together with optimal revenue estimates from simulated
annealing. Note the maximum of the revenue for inter-
mediate z. At small z many items are not element of
any bid and do not contribute to the revenue, while at
large z items are desired by multiple players resulting
in conflicts which restrict the revenue. The main body
of the figure shows analytical results [10] on the valid-
ity of RS. Above the phase boundary conflicts induce
replica-symmetry breaking (RSB), i.e. a clustering of
CA solutions into disconnected sets. RS results cannot
be trusted beyond that point and multiple metastable
states are found. Note that RSB in the typical case cor-
responds to non-convergence of BP on relatively large,
randomly generated single instances of CAs. This is con-
firmed by the symbols, which mark the points where BP
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FIG. 3: Phase diagram for constant-price CAs in the (α, z)-
plane: in the lower region, all solutions (maximum-revenue
configurations) belong to a single cluster, and RS equations
are believed to give the exact revenue result. In the upper
region the RS solution is not correct anymore. The symbols
mark the point where BP stops to converge on ∼ 3% of the
spins (N = 5000, averaged over 20 instances), and are con-
sistent with the line at which RS breaks. Inset: Maximal
revenue per item vs. z for α = 0.5, 1, 1.5 from top to bot-
tom. Average RS results (lines) are compared to simulated-
annealing data on single CA instances (markers). Results ob-
tained by iterating BP on the same CA instances (not shown)
are consistent with these curves.
stops to converge.
(ii) Linear prices — In this second, potentially more
realistic case the price of a bid is assumed to equal the
size of the desired subset, i.e. the price per item is con-
stant. Qualitatively, the revenue curves show a behaviour
similar to the constant-price case, cf. Fig. 4. For small z,
the revenue is very close to 1− e−λ, the fraction of items
wanted by at least one bidder. Even if there is little frus-
tration, it is not possible to sell all items as it would be
optimal for the auctioneer in this case [11]. For larger z,
replica symmetry breaking sets in as a result of increasing
frustration, and asymptotically the revenue curves are ex-
pected to decrease again with z. The increasing level of
frustration can also be seen in the fraction of successful
players in the group of players placing non-empty bids.
As also shown in Fig. 4, this fraction is found to decrease
monotonously with z, i.e. with the average number of
items wanted by a bidder (at fixed α).
(iii) Other ensembles— Other CA ensembles give rise
to even more complex phase diagrams. For instance, in
the elementary case of each player wanting a fixed num-
ber K of randomly chosen items, all at the same price
(corresponding to νi = const), one finds that the space
of optimal solutions is divided into an exponential num-
ber of geometrically distant clusters even for values of
α at which all items can be assigned without frustra-
tion. This corresponds to a 1-RSB mechanism observed
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FIG. 4: Revenue (increasing curves) and fraction ns of sat-
isfied players in the set of players with non-emtpy bids (de-
creasing curves) for the four optimization problems (α = 1).
Maximisation order is as follows: (i) R only (full lines), (ii)
Ns only (dashed lines), (iii) R before Ns (dash-dotted lines),
(iv) Ns before R (dotted lines). Revenues for (i) and (iii)
indistiguishable, ns for (ii) and (iv) indistinguishable. Sym-
bols mark the points where RS breaks down, RS results are
approximations at large z. The upper most increasing line
marks the fraction of items which are part of at least one bid,
i.e. the theoretical maximum number of auctionable objects.
in other hard combinatorial problems [8]. In such a re-
gion (e.g. α ∈ [.56, .59] for K = 5) message-passing al-
gorithms [9, 10] provide efficient techniques for finding
optimal assignments.
The extension to CAs with generic price distribution
is straightforward and will be presented elsewhere [10].
Let us finally mention that the case of linear prices
allows one to study multi-objective strategies for solv-
ing the WDP going beyond standard CA theory which
is mostly concerned with revenue maximization. As dis-
cussed before, one could also aim to maximize the num-
ber of satisfied players. As shown in Fig. 4, doing this
after maximizing the revenue has only very little effect
onNs. On the other hand, maximizing Ns independently
of the revenue leads to a substantial decrease in R. The
latter can be partially cured by maximizing the revenue
within the set of winner assignments of maximal Ns, but
also there the revenue remains well below its maximum.
A suitable strategy of taking into account both R and
Ns might be to send both β and µ to ∞, with a fixed
ratio β/µ controling the relative importance of either op-
timization task. By varying it one can continuously tune
the results between the extremes given before.
To conclude, we have presented a statistical physics
approach to the CA problem and introduced an itera-
tive algorithm for solving the WDP of large instances
of simple CAs. A relatively large body of literature
has been devoted to algorithms for solving WDP, such
as branch-and-bound and mixed integer programming
techniques (see [3, 4] and references therein). It would
be interesting to compare the performance of message-
passing algorithms with the existing approaches to WDP,
as it has been done recently for satisfiability problems in
Refs. [12, 13].
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